



Web security: OWASP project, CSRF threat and solutions.

Fabio Lombardi



About me

- Since 2013
 - Research & Development Engineer @Bonitasoft



- Past:
 - 2 years as Web Penetration Tester Consultant
 - Post-graduate studies in IT Security and Software engineering

Security checklist

Anti-SQL-injection protection



SSL and OpenSSL up to date



AES encryption on sensitive data



Passwords hashed with salt



Multi-factor authentication on the back-office



Preventing the PM from sending the whole unencrypted database by email



CommitStrip.com

DID YOU
KNOW



In the US



\$5,400,000

**Average organization cost
of a data breach**

\$277

**Average cost per stolen
record**

#


~ 10,000

**Cyber attacks attempts against the US
Navy since this talk started**

From a 2013 Fonemon institute study: Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis

... and in Europe

The average total organizational cost of data breach
Measured in US\$



From a 2013 Fonemon institute study: Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis

Seeing the financial consequences of a security breach

How do the costs of a breach add up across six categories?

29%

Reputation and
brand damage



21%

Lost
productivity



19%

Lost
Revenue



12%

Forensics



10%

Technical
support



8%

Compliance
Regulatory



Ref: <http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/en/it-services/security-services/data-breach/>

It's not just about money...



233 million users



1 million people



800,000 users



iCloud
personal photos leakage




thousands credit cards



200,000 snapchat photos

but why?

Security has to be taken into account



How to change things?



The reference for web application security



OWASP

The Open Web Application
Security Project

<https://www.owasp.org>



<https://www.youtube.com/user/OWASPGLOBAL>



LAPSE+ plugin for code source analysis


Example of a vulnerability description

2013 Top 10 List

Threat Agents	Attack Vectors	Security Weakness		Technical Impacts	Business Impacts
Application Specific	Exploitability AVERAGE	Prevalence COMMON	Detectability EASY	Impact MODERATE	Application / Business Specific
...
Am I Vulnerable To 'Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)'?			How Do I Prevent 'Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)'?		
...			...		
Example Attack Scenarios			References		
...			...		

Ref: [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A8-Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_\(CSRF\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-A8-Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF))

the
OWASP TOP
10 APPLICATION
SECURITY RISKS



Ref: <https://www.veracode.com/blog/2012/06/building-secure-web-applications-infographic>

CSRF (Cross-Site request forgery)

- Not well known (w.r.t. XSS or SQLInjection)
- Impacts
 - Malicious money transfers
 - User creation
 - Privilege escalation
 - Compromise end user data
 - The entire web application can be compromised
 - ...




CSRF: The attack


data



My-site.com



User




Attacker web page


CSRF: The attack



The user logs-in to My-site.com




CSRF: The attack




- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a **session cookie**

CSRF: The attack




- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a **session cookie**
- 3 The user is authorized to make API calls

CSRF: The attack




- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a **session cookie**
- 3 The user is free to make API calls
- 4 The user **simply browses** the malicious web page

CSRF: The attack



- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a **session cookie**
- 3 The user is free to make API calls
- 4 The user **simply browses** the malicious web page
- 5 The malicious web page makes **blind API calls** on the **user behalf** on my-site.com


CSRF: The attack



- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a **session cookie**
- 3 The user is free to make API calls
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- 6 **Data** is compromised



The Attacker web page



- Example:
 - A popular web site clone (phishing tools) + hidden:

```
<iframe src=../attack_payload.html width=0 height=0> </iframe>
```

- attack_payload.html:

```
attack_payload.html
<form id="adduser" action="http://my-site.com/API/users/" method="POST" enctype="text/plain">
  <input name='{ "password_confirm": "password", "userName": "newuser2", "firstname": "test2", "password": "password", "ignore_me": ""
  value="test"}' type="hidden">


  <input type="submit" value="CSRF me !">
</form>

<script type="text/JavaScript">document.getElementById("adduser").submit(); </script>
```

- **action="http://my-site.com/API/users"** works using the session cookie obtained from my-site.com page
 - Generates a **HTTP POST** call to my-site.com on user behalf
 - **A new user is created**

Why the attack works?


- It's due to a web browser feature



- The session is kept alive for multiple browser tabs

The attack weaknesses

- The attacker only attempts **blind attacks**
 - Cannot read the HTTP response



- Cannot read the session cookie




CSRF: Solution


data



My-site.com



User




Attacker web page

CSRF: Solution




The user logs-in to My-site.com




CSRF: Solution



- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a session cookie + **X-API-Token** in the **response header**




CSRF: Solution




- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a session cookie + **X-API-Token** in the **response header**
- 3 The user has to resend the **X-API-Token** in the **request header** of further API calls

CSRF: Solution




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CSRF: Solution



- 1 The user logs-in to My-site.com
- 2 My-site.com sends back a session cookie + X-API-Token in the **response header**
- 3 The user has to resend the **X-API-Token** in the **request header** of further API calls
- 4 The user simply browses the malicious web page
- 5 The malicious web page blindly attempts to make the API call **but without knowing the X-API-Token**

CSRF: Solution





Solution: server side

- Token generation

```
public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain) throws IOException, ServletException {  
    final HttpServletRequest req = (HttpServletRequest) request;  
    final HttpServletResponse res = (HttpServletResponse) response;  
  
    // Create  
    Object apiTokenFromClient = req.getSession().getAttribute("api_token");  
    if (apiTokenFromClient == null) {  
        apiTokenFromClient = new APIToken().getToken();  
        req.getSession().setAttribute("api_token", apiTokenFromClient);  
    }  
  
    res.addHeader("X-API-Token", apiTokenFromClient.toString());  
    chain.doFilter(req, res);  
}
```

- Token check

```
boolean checkValidCondition(HttpServletRequest httpRequest, HttpServletResponse httpResponse) {  
    String headerFromRequest = httpRequest.getHeader("X-API-Token");  
    String apiToken = (String) httpRequest.getSession().getAttribute("api_token");  
  
    if (headerFromRequest == null || !headerFromRequest.equals(apiToken)) {  
        httpResponse.setStatus(HttpServletResponse.SC_UNAUTHORIZED);  
        return false;  
    }  
    return true;  
}
```



Solution: client side

- Session initialization

```
protected void initSession(final Action callback) {  
  
    @Override  
    public void onSuccess(final int httpStatusCode, final String response, final Map<String, String> headers) {  
        if (headers.get("X-API-Token") != null) {  
            UserSessionVariables.addUserVariable(UserSessionVariables.API_TOKEN, headers.get("X-API-Token"));  
        }  
    }  
}  
}
```

- API Requests

```
public void send(final Method method, final String url, final String datas, final String contentType, final HttpCallback callback) {  
    final RequestBuilder builder = new RequestBuilder(method, url);  
    if (datas != null) {  
        builder.setRequestData(datas);  
    }  
    if (UserSessionVariables.getUserVariable(UserSessionVariables.API_TOKEN) != null) {  
        builder.setHeader("X-API-Token", UserSessionVariables.getUserVariable(UserSessionVariables.API_TOKEN));  
    }  
    builder.setTimeoutMillis(30000);  
    builder.setCallback(callback);  
    Request request = null;  
    try {  
        request = builder.send();  
    } catch (final RequestException e) {  
        callback.onError(request, e);  
    }  
}
```

OWASP Eclipse plugin



LAPSE +

The Security Scanner for Java EE Applications

Static code analysis for detecting the some OWASP vulnerabilities.
Three steps:

Vulnerability Source, Vulnerability Sink and Provenance Tracker

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_LAPSE_Project

<https://code.google.com/p/lapse-plus/>

<http://suif.stanford.edu/~livshits/work/lapse/index.html>

Test4.java

```

connection = DriverManager.getConnection(DataURL, LOGIN,
    PASSWORD);
} catch (SQLException e) {
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block
    e.printStackTrace();
}

String Username = request.getParameter("USER"); // From HTTP request

String Password = request.getParameter("PASSWORD"); // From HTTP request

int iUserID = -1;

String sLoggedUser = "";

String sel = "SELECT User_id, Username FROM USERS WHERE Username = '"
    + Username + "' AND Password = '" + Password + "'";

Statement selectStatement = null;
try {
    selectStatement = (Statement) connection.createStatement();
} catch (SQLException e) {
    // TODO Auto-generated catch block

```

Provenance Tracker Vulnerability Sinks Vulnerability Sources

Created a slice with 5 leaf element(s) and 5 element(s) located in 1 file(s) with 0 element(s) truncated with a maximum depth of 1. Using a flat viewer.

- ◆ "SELECT User_id, Username FROM USERS WHERE Username = " (Test4.java:65) [string constant]
- ◆ request.getParameter("USER") (Test4.java:57) [call expression]
- ◆ " AND Password = " (Test4.java:66) [string constant]
- ◆ request.getParameter("PASSWORD") (Test4.java:59) [call expression]
- ◆ "" (Test4.java:66) [string constant]

request.getParameter("USER") (Test4.java:57) [call expression]



KEEP
CALM
AND
~~CARRY ON~~

REACT!

Thank you



@lomba_fabio



fr.linkedin.com/pub/fabio-lombardi/27/833/660/